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n the 2017 series of the UK reality television show The Apprentice, a group of 
women discussed a sales strategy for maximizing the revenue of their burger 
stand in London’s financial sector. Celebrity businessperson Karren Brady 
eavesdropped on their conversation. One contestant remarked that since the 
financial sector is male dominated, they should make sure that the team mem-
bers chosen to sell the food are “attractive.” Here, Brady cut in: “What do you 
mean about attractive?” The contestant, now more tentatively, responded that 
the salesperson must be “good at selling and . . . they have to be good to sell to 
men, if you see what I’m saying.” Brady pressed her: “No, I don’t know what 
you’re saying. What are you saying?”1 The team of hopefuls fell silent, Brady’s 
feigned misunderstanding of a widely understood and commonly used sexist 
sales strategy hanging in the now charged air. They all knew what the contestant 
was saying, and they knew Brady understood and was pretending not to. To ex-
plain would be to bring the sexism into the open, to commit to its assumptions, 
and to admit to having suggested that those assumptions be capitalized on and 
thereby entrenched. The contestant, precisely because Brady refused to under-
stand, was made to confront the fact that her comment was ethically dubious.
In this paper, I develop and endorse a generalized version of the tactic of 
epistemic resistance that Brady deployed to expose and disarm the contestant’s 
sexism. In doing so, I draw on the work of Gaile Pohlhaus Jr., who shows that 
imploring marginalized people to understand marginalizing practices amounts 
to a request that they legitimize their own oppression.2 I expand on Pohlhaus’s 
analysis in two novel ways. First, I rehearse what it is to understand by exploring 
its association with explanation. Using Van Fraassen’s and Achinstein’s pragmatic 
theories of explanation, I describe explanations as answers to why-questions and 
as speech acts whose success depends on the explainee revising her background 
1 Scott Bryan, “Karren Brady Shut Down a Sexist Comment on ‘The Apprentice’ and It’s 
Great,” BuzzFeed, October 5, 2017. https://www.buzzfeed.com/scottybryan/none-of-you 
-strike-me-as-shy.
2 Pohlhaus, “Wrongful Requests and Strategic Refusals to Understand.”
I
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assumptions as directed by the explainer.3 The revision to the explainee’s back-
ground assumptions sometimes requires the acceptance of generalizations that 
are ethically and epistemically troubling. In those cases, the explanation should 
be blocked. I advocate a variety of explanatory resistance in which the explain-
ee feigns misunderstanding to corner the explainer into exposing or retreating 
from the false, harmful assumptions upon which their explanation depends. I 
call this strategy “disunderstanding.”
Second, I situate this strategy within Fricker’s epistemic injustice schema as 
a response to what I call “explanatory injustice,” emphasizing the fact that mar-
ginalized people are not able to participate fully in the construction of expla-
nations and are liable to be harmed by wrongful explanations.4 I conclude that 
we should be more cognizant of the way power and marginalization delimit the 
epistemic terrain, and be prepared to undertake resistance in order to uncloak 
the ensuing ethical and epistemic shortcomings.
1. Strategic Refusals to Understand
Conventional wisdom has it that attempting to understand others and follow 
their reasoning is ethically and epistemically virtuous. Consider the Principle 
of Charity, whose observance is often taken to be a cornerstone of courteous, 
productive dialogue: “We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of 
others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement.”5 Pohlhaus shows 
that, in certain contexts, refusing to understand can be ethically and epistemical-
ly preferable. She focuses on situations in which members of oppressed groups 
are asked to follow the reasoning of those in privileged positions as they attempt 
to justify their oppressive actions. Pohlhaus shows that in such cases a listener 
refusing to understand can be a form of resistance, an invitation to a more pro-
ductive interaction, and a way of bringing oppressive beliefs “out of the back-
ground and to the fore.”6 This is ethically productive since it combats oppressive 
ideologies, and is epistemically productive because it demands the rejection or 
revision of false or misleading assumptions.
Pohlhaus’s argument is elucidated via an example. She draws on the work 
of Patricia Williams, who describes the use of buzzer systems by shop owners 
3 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image; Achinstein, The Nature of Explanation.
4 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice.
5 Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” 197. The principle of charity is a con-
tent-based ideal, while “civility” is primarily a tone-based ideal for productive discussion. 
See Shahvisi, “Privilege, Platforms, and Power,” for a critique of the expectation of civility.
6 Pohlhaus, “Wrongful Requests and Strategic Refusals to Understand,” 238.
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in New York City in the 1980s to screen customers and refuse entry to those 
who were deemed to look “undesirable,” where undesirability was primarily de-
termined by race.7 The buzzer system was widely discussed and protested, but 
soon became standard practice in many small shops. Williams recounts the way 
in which the public debate was characterized by Black people being asked to un-
derstand the decisions of white shopkeepers and retail assistants. She refers to a 
letter to the New York Times whose white authors ask Black readers to admit that 
they too would exclude themselves. She refers to the “repeated public urging 
that blacks put themselves in the shoes of white store owners, and that, in effect, 
blacks look into the mirror of frightened whites [sic] faces to the reality of their 
undesirability; and that then blacks would ‘just as surely conclude that [they] 
would not let [themselves] in under similar circumstances.’”8
This case raises serious ethical and epistemic issues. Williams, and other 
Black people, are asked to join racist shopkeepers in rejecting themselves and 
accepting lines of reasoning that position them as violent and threatening in or-
der to present racial profiling as justifiable. Williams qua Black person is urged 
to understand herself as a person who should be excluded as dangerous. Her 
understanding may be taken as an admission: I can reasonably be categorized as 
that sort of person; your response is appropriate. As such, she is being asked to co-
operate in perpetuating a falsehood. That is the epistemic wrong.
The ethical wrong that is committed in requesting her understanding con-
sists in the demand that she cooperate in the suppression of her subjectivity by 
limiting her range of action and by foreclosing the option of calling out the harm 
perpetuated by the understanding. If Williams agrees to understand the debate 
as it is presented, she must concede that she looks like a dangerous person who 
induces such fear in others that they cannot reasonably be asked to share en-
closed public spaces with her and that she is automatically such a person by vir-
tue of being Black. To accede to this is to limit her own epistemic possibilities. 
For if she agrees that it is acceptable to stereotype her and exclude her, she and 
other Black people are thereby hindered in challenging racism in this case and 
others. She is being asked to renounce a position from which she can criticize 
any subsequent harms, since understanding the racist assumptions would also 
imply an understanding of any actions premised on them. Further, consenting 
to be interpreted as an instance of a stereotype would mean relinquishing some-
thing of the individual agency that is required to participate meaningfully in the 
epistemic community. As Pohlhaus says:
7 Williams, “Spirit-Murdering the Messenger.”
8 Williams, “Spirit-Murdering the Messenger,” 129, brackets in original.
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Persons are being called to understand something that only makes sense 
from within patterns and practices that hold oppressive power relations 
firmly in place and that actively prevent those asked to understand from 
calling attention to this fact. . . . In these cases, demonstrating the harm 
that the requested understanding does can only be done from worlds that 
actively resist the sense of the world one has been implicitly asked to in-
habit.9
These examples demonstrate that the request that one understand can be con-
stitutive of the marginalization one is being asked to understand. In these cases, 
the person who requests that the listener understand thereby wrongs the listener. 
And a marginalized person may not have the luxury of refusal; refusing to signal 
assent could escalate into more immediate harms. Yet agreeing to understand 
entails complicity, since the hearer is asked to join the speaker in recognizing the 
acceptability or inevitability of the oppressive claims, thereby entrenching their 
acceptability.10 One might describe this as a request that the listener internalize 
the oppression by affirming a negative self-perception of automatic wrongdoing, 
leading to reduced agency.11 There is a double bind.
Pohlhaus’s examples are not exceptional; they belong to a broader trend of 
requests for understanding that entreat the listener to accept oppressive assump-
tions. These requests need not be made of members of oppressed groups in or-
der to be wrongful, though they are clearly more wrongful, and wrongful in a way 
that is more liable to cause harm, where the request to understand a form of op-
pression is made of a person whose oppression takes that form. Any request that 
oppressive assumptions be accepted presents ethical and epistemic concerns, 
and this paper considers listeners of all positionalities, since the responsibility 
for justice falls to all of us.
Wrongful requests for understanding are not rare. In conversations in which 
marginalizing comments are made, speakers typically deploy common expres-
sions that enjoin the listener to see the sense and obviousness of what is being 
said and to offer comprehension (e.g., “put yourself in the shoes of ”; “you have 
to understand that”; “surely you can see that”; “it goes without saying that”; “you 
know what I mean”). Consider this excerpt from a 2009 television appearance of 
US Fox News presenter Brian Kilmeade:
9 Pohlhaus, “Wrongful Requests and Strategic Refusals to Understand,” 231–32.
10 This complicity is best understood as attributability, rather than accountability, in the sense 
described by Zheng in “Attributability, Accountability, and Implicit Bias.”
11 Liebow, “Internalized Oppression and Its Varied Moral Harms”; Bartky, Femininity and 
Domination.
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I asked [a Muslim] one time . . . “How do you feel about the extra scrutiny, 
clearly, you’re getting at the airports?” And he said, “I’m all for it, because 
I want to get home to my family, too.” And that’s really got to be the atti-
tude. So, if you’re Islamic, or you’re Muslim and you’re in the military, you 
have to understand . . . and that’s just the fact right now in the war that was 
declared on us.12
Kilmeade requires that Muslims understand their racial profiling and, further, 
that they accordingly have the “right” attitude toward it—that is, one of accep-
tance and empathy with the assumptions underwriting the practice. Having 
the “right attitude” is a request for affective labor as well as understanding. Not 
only must oppressed people understand the oppressive practice, but they must 
also signal approval and strive to ensure that others do not feel bad about their 
(support for) oppressive behavior. Racial profiling is a common occasion for 
wrongful requests for understanding, where “safety” and “security” are taken to 
be concerns whose primacy one cannot reject without seeming unreasonable 
and reckless, even though the benefits and burdens are clearly unevenly distrib-
uted. Consider that more than half of British people support the racial profiling 
of (those who appear to be) Muslims or Arabs for “security” reasons.13 Those 
who are targeted are expected to prioritize this abstract notion of security even 
though doing so imperils their own more tangible personal security and comfort 
and that of other people of color.
In a similar way, Daily Mail columnist Max Pemberton invokes understand-
ability in his appraisal of a man who murdered his own wife and daughter:
Of course, such men are often motivated by anger and a desire to punish 
the spouse.
But while killing their partner as an act of revenge may be understand-
able, for a man to kill his children (who are innocent bystanders in a mar-
ital breakdown) is a very different matter.
I believe it is often a twisted act of love, as the man crassly believes 
that the crisis in their lives is so great that the children would be better 
off dead.14
As feminist writer Laura Bates notes, Pemberton not only suggests that the 
murder of a wife may be “understandable” but also goes on to normalize the 
12 Millican, Schwen, and Berrier, “What Does Brian Kilmeade Have to Say to Get Fired?” ital-
ics added.
13 YouGov and Arab News, “UK Attitudes toward the Arab World.”
14 Quoted in Bates, “A Cycle of Violence,” emphasis added.
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act by distancing it from the murder of the daughter, which is a “very different 
matter” since she is, by contrast, “innocent.”15 Even so, the killing of the child is 
described as an “act of love,” if a “twisted” one, that is hypothesized to protect 
children from “crisis in their lives.” Pemberton urges us to see that both killings 
are understandable, provided one is charitable in considering the point of view 
of the killer.
In cases such as these, in which one is faced with a wrongful request for un-
derstanding, Pohlhaus argues that it is ethically and epistemically productive to 
strategically withhold comprehension. Such refusals are already in operation, as 
evidenced by Brady’s feigned misunderstanding in the opening example. My 
aim in the rest of this paper is to further analyze and systematize these forms 
of resistance. I begin by examining what is meant by “understanding” through a 
study of its relationship to explanation.
2. Explanation, Understanding, and Injustice
Wrongful requests for understanding are more easily identified and blocked if 
we have a clearer sense of what it means to understand. In this section, I explore 
pragmatic conceptions of explanation, which draw on the relationship between 
explanation and understanding, and then consider the ways in which explana-
tions can be unjust. This lays the groundwork for the account of strategic refusals 
to understand that I introduce in section 3.
2.1. Understanding as an Effect of Explanation
Successful explanations impart understanding, and a person who does not un-
derstand is a person who lacks an (adequate) explanation.16 A wrongful request 
for understanding is therefore a request that a wrongful explanation be accept-
ed. But what is an explanation? Since I am addressing a problem relating to the 
everyday use of explanations and understanding in particular social contexts, 
a pragmatic account of explanation is most apt. Pragmatic, or “contextual,” ac-
counts of explanation are concerned with the use of explanations and the role of 
contextual factors, such as background knowledge and interests, in determining 
explanatory success. I explore a synthesis of two prominent pragmatic theories 
15 Bates, “A Cycle of Violence.” Note that family annihilators—men who murder their families 
immediately prior to killing themselves—are chillingly common. In the US, these incidents 
occur as often as once a week (Manne, Down Girl).
16 Khalifa, “Inaugurating Understanding or Repackaging Explanation?”; Strevens, “No Un-
derstanding without Explanation.” Though it will not be important for the purposes of our 
inquiry here, note that there is a lively literature on the relationship between scientific ex-
planations and understanding (De Regt, “Understanding and Explanation”).
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of explanation: that of Van Fraassen and that of Achinstein.17 Examining these 
theories offers insights as to how to conceive of, and disrupt, understanding.
One of the most well-known pragmatic accounts of explanation is given by 
Van Fraassen, who describes a demand for explanation as a particular kind of 
question, and an explanation as an adequate answer to that question, which dis-
penses with the explainee’s original explanatory demand by delivering the un-
derstanding that was sought. Though they are not always immediately framed as 
such, explananda can be read as contrastive “why-questions.” That is, a request 
for explanation can be expressed in the following form: Why event Pk (the ex-
planandum) rather than any of the alternative events in its contrast class X (P1, 
P2, . . . Pn)? The contrast class enumerates all the other possible events that could 
have obtained instead of Pk. Context is critical. There are many different ways of 
forming the contrast class, depending on what precisely is being asked. If I see 
some children hitting another child in the street and say “Hey, what’s going on 
here?” this is a demand for explanation that contains the why-question “Why 
are you hitting that child?” and the contrast class “rather than playing with her, 
leaving her alone, etc.” The children must assess the context of the situation in 
order to ascertain that this is the contrast class I intend, and answer appropriate-
ly. They might get the contrast class wrong and say “What, you think we should 
kick her instead?”
Context also features in the kind of explanation that is requested. Explainers 
must take note of the “relevance relation” R, which encompasses other contextu-
al factors that are relevant to providing an adequate answer. In the example above, 
the children must work out what kind of explanation I am asking for. They will 
likely assume that I am referring to the hitting, that I think that (unjustified) hit-
ting is wrong and surprising, and that they ought therefore to attempt to justify 
the hitting, with reference to some causally relevant event (“She said something 
racist”), or to stop doing it in an attempt to evade the explanatory demand. If 
they get the relevance relation wrong, by making incorrect assumptions about 
my background knowledge, they might offer an explanation that is unsatisfacto-
ry—for example, “It was our turn” or “It’s the first day of the month.”18
One asks “Why Pk?” when Pk is surprising, because one expected another 
possible state of affairs instead. That surprise is typically the result of the explain-
ee having incomplete, inadequate, or false information relating to the occurrence 
of Pk. Accordingly, the explanation furnishes the explainee with information 
that renders Pk unsurprising, or even expectable. Therefore, to explain an event 
17 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image; Achinstein, The Nature of Explanation.
18 A British folk ritual involves starting the month by declaring “a pinch and a punch for the 
first day of the month!” while pinching and punching someone.
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is to show that “given the particular circumstances and the laws in question, the 
occurrence of the phenomenon was to be expected; and it is in this sense that the 
explanation enables us to understand why the phenomenon occurred.”19
Making an explanandum expectable is the central function of an explanation. 
An explanation is requested when a particular occurrence seems unusual or sur-
prising relative to an extant set of background assumptions; explaining elimi-
nates that surprise by providing additional information that causes the explainee 
to revise her assumptions, making the occurrence seem ordinary. Therefore, “a 
(good) explanation raises or makes high its explanandum’s probability, p; and 
the more it does so (ceteris paribus) the better it is.”20 Explanations therefore 
convert surprising facts into unsurprising facts by modifying the auxiliary as-
sumptions of the explainee.
A second pragmatic theory of explanation is Achinstein’s description of ex-
planations as “illocutionary acts.”21 This term was coined by Austin, who de-
scribed speech acts as utterances that not only provide information but also do 
something. Austin distinguishes three kinds of speech acts. A “locutionary” act 
is simply the action of making a meaningful utterance (e.g., “You upset me”). 
An “illocutionary” act is the action that results from the utterance, which in the 
case of “You upset me” is the action by which the speaker informs the hearer of 
the effects of their behavior. A “perlocutionary” act is the effect of the utterance, 
which in this case might be to induce feelings of guilt or regret. In Austin’s words:
Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain conse-
quential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, 
or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it may be done with the de-
sign, intention, or purpose of producing them. . . . We shall call the per-
formance of an act of this kind the performance of a perlocutionary act 
or perlocution.22
While illocutionary acts focus on the function of the utterance, perlocutionary 
acts describe its effects. Asking “Is anyone else cold?” is on the face of it a state-
ment about a person’s own temperature and a question about the temperature 
of those in the room, but it can also perform the illocutionary act of requesting 
permission to raise the temperature of the thermostat and might have the perlo-
cutionary effect of someone feeling obliged to offer you their jumper.
According to Achinstein’s theory, to explain is to do something. Explanations 
19 Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, 337, italics in original.
20 Mellor, “Probable Explanation,” 232.
21 Achinstein, The Nature of Explanation.
22 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 101.
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are therefore illocutionary acts: explainers set out to do something when they 
offer explanations.23 They intend to make something understandable, to answer 
a question, to make the explanandum less surprising. Yet this analysis can be tak-
en further than Achinstein does, since explanations are also perlocutionary acts. 
Recall that on Van Fraassen’s theory explanations answer why-questions. They 
do so by reconfiguring the background assumptions of the explainee in order 
to make the explanandum expectable. But, crucially, as I will explore later, that 
process is one over which the explainee exercises influence.
In a similar vein to Van Fraassen’s contrast class and relevance relation, which 
summarize the contextual information that is necessary to providing a successful 
explanation, Achinstein distinguishes the “goodness” of explanations from their 
“correctness.” A correct explanation is one whose propositional content is true; 
a good explanation is one that is appropriate given the background knowledge 
and interests of the explainee. Consider that “because of the initial conditions of 
the universe plus the fundamental laws of nature” might seem like a reasonable 
causal explanation of any event, and it is most likely also a correct explanation, 
but it is (almost) never a good one. A correct explanation need not be good, and 
that determination depends on the explainee. If I explain to a layperson why 
grass is green by reference to the electron configuration around the molecular 
structure of chlorophyll, that is unlikely to be a good explanation even though 
it is correct. Equally, a good explanation may not be a correct one. If a child asks 
why the mince pie is gone and I say “Santa ate it,” they are likely to take this to 
be a good explanation even though it is not a correct one. We must strive for 
goodness and correctness in our explanations.
The idea of a good explanation mirrors Austin’s “felicity conditions,” which 
must be met in order for a speech act to succeed.24 Among other things, success 
requires that the listener receive the utterance in the way in which the speaker 
intended it. This requires the speaker to pay attention to the background knowl-
edge of the listener, but it also requires the listener to play her role in coopera-
tively granting uptake. Jennifer Hornsby describes “successful illocutionary acts” 
as those characterized by reciprocity, where interlocutors “recognize one anoth-
er’s speech as it is meant to be taken: An audience who participates reciprocal-
ly does not merely understand the speaker’s words but also, in taking the words 
as they are meant to be taken, satisfies a condition for the speaker’s having done 
the communicative thing that she intended.”25 In the context of explanations, 
23 By contrast, Hempel was concerned with the locutionary aspects of explanation (“Studies 
in the Logic of Explanation”; Aspects of Scientific Explanation).
24 Austin, How to Do Things with Words.
25 Hornsby, “Disempowered Speech,” 134, emphasis added.
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the idea of “taking the words as they are meant to be taken”—or of indicating 
to the person explaining that their explanation was a “good” one or that your 
why-question has been answered—points to the important role of the listener 
in ensuring both that understanding goes through and that this uptake is com-
municated, for example, by saying “Ah, I see” or “That makes sense now,” or by 
nodding and asking no further questions.
Taking all this together, we can see that a refusal to understand in Pohlhaus’s 
sense amounts to a refusal to accept an explanation, which can be achieved by 
responding to the explanation in such a way as to block the perlocutionary act 
of having one’s auxiliary assumptions revised in the way the explainer intends. 
Note that the explanation may well have made sense in some limited sense, and 
the explainee may well understand in some limited sense (as Brady clearly did 
in the Apprentice case), but the point here is that the explainee has spotted that 
something is ethically and epistemically amiss, and is accordingly performing the 
refusal as a way of encouraging the explainer, and any onlooker, to change their 
auxiliary assumptions. Whatever surprise motivated the explanatory demand 
then persists, and the explainer is obliged to switch course, hopefully giving 
more careful thought to their explanation.
Returning to Williams’s experience of racial profiling, consider that custom-
ers wishing to enter shops are normally allowed to do so. Being refused entry, or 
learning one might be refused entry, is surprising and requires explanation. The 
explanation provides some additional information to Williams: you, by virtue of 
your race, are threatening, and your presence in the shop will make people uncom-
fortable. Williams is supposed to respond by revising her auxiliary assumptions; 
while she previously thought of herself as a nonthreatening person attempting 
to buy a gift for her mother, she must now mitigate her surprise at being denied 
entry to the shop by agreeing to see herself, and other Black people, as threaten-
ing. She is supposed to reason that if a person made her fearful, she too would 
want them to be denied admittance to a shop she was browsing or working in. 
The “error” that led to her not understanding and requiring an explanation was 
her belief that she is not a scary person, that she is an ordinary, nonthreatening 
person. If the explanation goes through, she stands corrected. But this revision 
to her auxiliary assumptions must be resisted. It cannot be right to ask a person 
to replace their surprise at an injustice with an acceptance that they are a person 
who automatically deserves to be treated unjustly. To do so is to ask them to 
concede that what would normally count as an injustice is not so in relation to 
them, on the grounds that they belong to a social group for whom that harmful 
treatment is deemed to be apt. We must ask what happens if Williams, or an 
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onlooker, responds with “I’m sorry, I don’t understand” or “What is it about me/
her that warrants this treatment?” I return to this question in section 3.
2.2. Explanatory Injustice
As we have seen, explanations act on and shape our beliefs, and they are con-
text dependent and interest relative. Values unavoidably affect the explanations 
that are and are not requested, offered, and accepted. It is therefore important to 
briefly consider the operation of power in relation to explanations: who gets to 
explain and who is generally required to accept explanations offered by others. 
In this section, I describe how explanations, as a core knowledge-production 
activity, are related to “epistemic injustices.”
Epistemic injustice occurs when people are wronged specifically in their ca-
pacities as knowers.26 To be wronged as a knower is to be wronged as a member 
of a community of people who generate knowledge by interpreting the world 
and sharing their interpretations with others. Epistemic injustice, as charac-
terized by Fricker, comes in two varieties: testimonial injustice, which limits a 
person’s ability to share knowledge, and hermeneutical injustice, which limits a 
person’s ability to generate knowledge.
A testimonial injustice occurs when a person, due to identity prejudices held 
by listeners, has her credibility as a testifier systematically misjudged. In assess-
ing the quality of the testimony of others, we take shortcuts based on widespread 
stereotypes about the social groups we believe them to belong to. Members of 
marginalized groups are often subject to credibility deficits and are liable not 
to be believed or taken seriously even when they are authorities on the topic 
under discussion. Conversely, members of privileged groups are often subject to 
credibility excesses, where they are granted authority even in relation to topics 
on which they have no expertise. Women experience credibility deficits relative 
to men, people of color relative to white people, working-class people relative to 
middle-class people, and nonnative language speakers relative to native speakers.
A hermeneutical injustice obtains when a group of people, due to structural 
prejudice in the collective interpretational resources, has some substantial part 
of its social experience obscured from collective understanding. They are pre-
vented from articulating their situation by a paucity in the shared inventory of 
available vocabulary, conceptual frameworks, and causal models. Again, mem-
bers of marginalized groups are most likely to be subject to this kind of injustice, 
and these lacunae can result in the inability to successfully communicate injus-
tices that affect them particularly or overwhelmingly, which may cause distress, 
alienation, and cognitive dissonance, and can obstruct meaningful change. Her-
26 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice.
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meneutical injustice therefore limits the agency of those it affects. Consider that 
before the introduction of the term “sexual harassment” in the 1970s, women 
were unable to effectively communicate their experiences in the workplace and 
struggled to pursue justice against their harassers—there was simply no widely 
accepted concept or terminology for the wrongs committed against them. Her-
meneutical injustices occur because marginalized people are also marginalized 
within the processes of developing concepts and terms for understanding the 
social world—they are rarely the toolmakers in our knowledge economy, or at 
least, their tools are seldom adopted by others. And while in the long term we are 
all epistemically impoverished by hermeneutical injustices, since understanding 
the social world around us is a collective good, the actual short-term burdens are 
not equally shared: hermeneutical injustices are “like holes in the ozone—it’s 
the people who live under them that get burned.”27
As we have seen, explanations act on the world, emphasizing, obfuscating, 
and reconfiguring our communal and individual background assumptions. They 
are key elements of knowledge exchange and are essential to testimony and inter-
pretation. Yet, as with other kinds of knowledge exchange, knowers are variably 
situated with respect to the product and receipt of explanations. Some knowers 
hold a monopoly on the production of explanations, via both their perceived 
credibility and their access to platforms, while others do not have the credibil-
ity to be influential or successful explainers, may be more liable to be harmed 
by wrongful explanations, and may particularly suffer for the lack of communal 
conceptual resources that are required to explain their situation to others. Mem-
bers of privileged social groups typically dominate roles in which one teaches, 
instructs, or advises others, and are vastly overrepresented within disciplines 
that permit them to influence public discourse: academia, law, science, journal-
ism, and politics. These are the people that society accepts as most authoritative. 
They have greater control over the production and reproduction of mainstream 
explanations that determine the way in which we receive and understand gener-
alizations about the world.
It is therefore instructive to introduce a specific form of epistemic injustice 
that I will call “explanatory injustice.”28 Explanatory injustice combines ele-
27 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 161.
28 One species of explanatory injustice that has received considerable attention in recent years 
is “mansplaining,” which refers to instances in which a man explains something to a woman, 
where: (a) he uses a condescending tone, and (b) she already knows about, or is positioned 
to know more about, the explanandum in question. Mansplaining exhibits testimonial in-
justice: it requires a man to have estimated his own credibility on the topic in question to 
be greater than his woman interlocutor’s. Likewise for whitesplaining, in which a white per-
son condescendingly explains racism to people of color. Whitesplaining and mansplaining 
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ments of both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. The act of explaining is 
affected by testimonial injustice, since those who are granted the platforms nec-
essary for an explanation to be heard, and the credibility for an explanation to 
be believed, are generally those from privileged social groups. This tends to give 
members of privileged groups a monopoly on explaining. They are liable to pro-
duce and disseminate explanations that serve their own interests and agendas, or 
at least, they are unlikely to be able or willing to generate explanations that serve 
the explanatory needs of those from marginalized groups in challenging their 
marginalization. Accordingly, members of marginalized groups lack the concep-
tual resources to explain their experiences or dispute explanations that relate to 
them, which is a form of hermeneutical injustice. The explanations most widely 
and weightily circulated in our explanation economy are therefore those curated 
by more privileged people. The use of the word “economy” is significant: expla-
nations compete with one another, and the victors are invariably those expla-
nations proffered by the most dominant explainers that best fit with our extant 
background assumptions, as shaped by dominant explainers.
If particular groups have greater power over the creation and distribution of 
explanations, then explanations that favorably represent their interests are like-
ly to gain traction and explanations that represent the interests of other groups 
are liable to be quashed where they contradict more popular explanations. The 
background assumptions that are the substrate of explanations are therefore li-
able to be epistemically faulty (i.e., false, superficial, or misleading) where they 
refer to the properties or experiences of marginalized groups. In the next sub-
section, I describe how the epistemic and ethical status of explanations is also 
undermined by the nature of the generalizations upon which they rely.
2.3. When Explanations Go Wrong: The Trouble with Generalizations
I have shown (in section 2.1) that explanations act on the background assump-
tions of the explainee. The explainee is given new information, or alerted to infor-
mation she knew but did not consider relevant, in light of which her why-ques-
tion is answered and she understands something she did not understand before. 
Explanations that relate to the social world draw on background assumptions 
that cite social patterns and generalizations. But things can easily go wrong, both 
because of the identities of those most likely to generate and distribute general-
izations (section 2.2) and because of the nature of the background assumptions 
themselves. In this subsection, I discuss the latter.
Generalizations are the staple of the background assumptions whose revi-
provoke ire for marginalized people because they emphasize the monopoly that privileged 
people have over explanation and because they tend to silence and abase the listener.
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sion explanation consists in. As Langton says, if we wish to understand patterns 
and objects in the social world, we must look “for the regularities that reveal 
them in normal circumstances.”29 In other words, we must look for the patterns 
that the object of interest is implicated in and make generalizations accordingly. 
We may then base our explanations on those generalizations. Yet Langton warns 
that things may not always be so simple, since in “abnormal circumstances things 
may be distorted, and the regularities we see may not reveal their natures.”30
It seems that wrongful requests for understanding occur precisely in those 
“abnormal circumstances.” In many cases, the regularities we observe do not re-
flect the nature of things, rather the “world ‘arranges itself ’—at least in part—to 
fit what the powerful believe.”31 Explanations can cite superficial regularities and 
still function as good and even correct explanations. And if no further explana-
tion is requested or offered, sometimes the superficially true regularity that is 
referenced is taken to be descriptive of the nature of the social objects under 
study.
Recall that explanatory demands can be framed as why-questions. And the 
answer to a why-question can also be cast as a why-question, producing a re-
gress, where each new answer precedes the last along a causal chain. Where on 
that chain an explanation stops depends on the knowledge and interests of the 
explainer and the explainee, and not all stopping points are equal. If I ask why 
women, rather than men, tend to wear makeup, and I am told that women are 
generally more concerned about their appearance and being regarded as beau-
tiful, that is not an incorrect answer in terms of its veracity with respect to our 
social world (it could be argued to be correct and good in Achinstein’s sense), 
but it is a truncated one. That truncation is epistemically and ethically troubling 
because it implies something false and damaging about the nature of women. I 
could follow up by asking “Why are women generally more concerned about 
their appearance and being regarded as beautiful?” At some point, a patient, 
well-informed interlocutor would have to describe the objectification and sex-
ualization of women, but we may never get there if I take the first explanation at 
face value. Therefore, the explainee plays a critical role in what sort of explana-
tion is given and in whether that explanation itself needs explaining.
These harmful explanatory truncations often rely on nonquantified general-
izations, also known as generics. Generics, such as “women are superficial” or 
“Muslims are terrorists,” do not specify how many instantiations are necessary 
for their truth. They are often accepted even at low prevalence rates, especially 
29 Langton, “Feminism in Epistemology,” 142.
30 Langton, “Feminism in Epistemology,” 142.
31 Langton, “Feminism in Epistemology,” 140.
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in the case of “striking property generics,” which pick out a property that is dan-
gerous or considered to be particularly characteristic of members of that group.32 
Generics play a central role in our communication and understanding of pat-
terns in the world, yet we struggle to formalize their truth conditions, which 
is critical to their ability to mislead despite seeming correct.33 We have a ten-
dency to erroneously interpret and evaluate quantified statements as generics 
(e.g., it is widely noted that people tend to accept “all ducks lay eggs” despite 
knowing that drakes do not, implying it has instead been taken to mean “ducks 
lay eggs”), and studies show that people are willing to accept generics based on 
prevalence levels as low as 10 percent, yet when presented with a generic, infer 
prevalence estimates as high as 100 percent.34 Generics are frequently used in 
common parlance, as they offer succinct, memorable heuristics for navigating 
the social world, while quantified statements can be clumsy and require greater 
sophistication. Indeed, infants as young as thirty months have already acquired 
certain generics, and generics are frequently used to teach children about the 
world through straightforward patterns and associations (e.g., “dogs go woof ”; 
“boys do not cry”).35
Of the many errors in reasoning associated with generics, perhaps the most 
worrying is that where they attribute properties to members of a particular social 
group, listeners tend to essentialize that group—that is, to assume that members 
of that group have those properties by nature.36 Generics have false implicatures 
of naturalness, which Haslanger recommends be blocked via metalinguistic ne-
gation—for example, “It’s harmful and misleading to say Muslims are terrorists; 
there are extremists in every social group. Lots of Muslim-majority states have 
been destroyed by Western imperialism, which pushes people toward extrem-
ism, and Muslims have been portrayed particularly unfairly by Western politi-
cians and the media.” Identifying and blocking erroneous or misleading state-
ments in this way is important because otherwise:
Implicatures and presuppositions of this sort become part of the com-
mon ground, often in ways that are hard to notice and hard to combat, 
32 Prasada et al., “Conceptual Distinction amongst Generics”; Leslie, “The Original Sin of 
Cognition.”
33 Saul, “Are Generics Especially Pernicious?”
34 Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg, “Do All Ducks Lay Eggs?”; Leslie and Lerner, “Generic 
Generalizations”; Cimpian, Brandone, and Gelman, “Generic Statements Require Little Ev-
idence for Acceptance but Have Powerful Implications.”
35 Graham, Nayer, and Gelman, “Tw0-Year-Olds Use the Generic/Nongeneric Distinction to 
Guide Their Inferences about Novel Kinds.”
36 Leslie, “The Original Sin of Cognition.”
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and they become the background for our conversations and our practices. 
Once the assumption of, e.g., women’s submissive nature has been insert-
ed into the cultural common ground, it is extremely difficult and disrup-
tive to dislodge it. . . .
It is not the case that women are submissive, even if most women are 
submissive, in fact, even if all women are submissive, because submission 
is no part of women’s nature.37
Most explanations are built on generalizations, some of which falsely imply the 
innate, immutable natures of particular social groups. In particular, when racism 
or sexism are questioned, explainers are liable to use generalizations that cite the 
purported properties of particular groups (e.g., “Black people are dangerous”; 
“women are better at child-rearing”). Generics are not the only troubling gener-
alizations, and quantified generalizations can be just as concerning (e.g., “most 
men are bad at cleaning”). Generalizations of all kinds have the persuasive ad-
vantage of referring to what is immediate and simple rather than distant and com-
plex, and they therefore benefit from the tyranny of the face value. Consider how 
Ockham’s razor—which is informally encouraged as a heuristic in the practice of 
science and medicine, and is sometimes referred to in everyday conversation—
directs us toward the explanation that draws on the simplest hypothesis, which 
usually means the one that is most parsimonious in its assumptions. One might 
crudely apply this principle to erroneously conclude that the reason a dispropor-
tionate number of Black people have died from coronavirus is because they have 
some genetic susceptibility, rather than because of the complex, interlocking 
determinants of health in a racist society. Our proclivity for simplicity must be 
closely scrutinized. Indeed, it has been demonstrated empirically that explain-
ees prefer explanations that draw on relationships that are stable across changing 
circumstances, which might be taken to be a preference for explanations that 
rest on stereotypes.38 Moreover, generics and other generalizations are often not, 
strictly speaking, false, even if their implicatures are. This leads to the worry-
ing realization that explanations can go wrong even without the construction 
of outright falsehoods or any violation of the rules of explaining, so that correct 
explanations can nonetheless be misleading and can lead to the entrenchment of 
incorrect assumptions. The explanatory process is itself warped by the substrate 
of assumptions of the explainer and explainee, either deliberately or incidentally.
Strategic refusals to understand must be attentive to these errors of reasoning 
and cognizant of the opportunities presented by the collaborative nature of ex-
37 Haslanger, “Ideology, Generics, and Common Ground,” 198–99.
38 Lombrozo, “Causal–Explanatory Pluralism.”
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planations in exposing and disarming harmful assumptions. In the next section, 
I suggest one such strategy.
3. Explanatory Resistance: The Case for Disunderstanding
According to the pragmatic theories of explanation described in section 2.1, an 
explanans that does not explain is not an explanation. Importantly, the explainee 
is the primary adjudicator of whether the explanation succeeds. The process of 
explanation is therefore collaborative and dynamic, and the explainee plays a 
key role in the negotiation and its results. As such, the explainee might subvert 
this role as a way of resisting explanations that are morally troubling. Rejecting 
the explanans preserves the explanatory burden on the explainer, forcing her to 
elaborate or provide another explanans.
What I am describing does not amount to misunderstanding the explainer. A 
misunderstanding is a genuine failure to understand. In cases of interest, the lis-
tener is capable of understanding by accepting the explanation at face value with 
respect to the social norms with which it is offered, but refuses to do so, since 
the request for understanding and the agreement to understand are wrongful. 
The explanation may be a good one in Achinstein’s sense (and it may even be 
correct in some superficial sense), but it is not a good one in an ethical or epis-
temic sense. Consider that when a racist or sexist joke is made, the joke is usually 
well understood even by those who find it morally troubling—indeed, they may 
not be able to see why it is morally troubling unless they understand it—to the 
extent that they may see why it is funny or might find it funny in spite of their 
awareness of its harms.39 As Bergmann says, “Being aware of a [racist or sexist] 
belief is not the same as holding it.”40 A person can understand, but wish they 
did not. Misunderstanding therefore does not adequately capture the deliberate 
maneuver that I am recommending; the explainee understands, but strategically 
pretends not to. One must understand in order to pretend not to, so that the tac-
tic of strategic refusal I am describing is only available to those who see the sense 
of the explanation relative to the social world we live in but want to reconfigure 
that world so that it has greater epistemic and ethical integrity.
Let us instead refer to the form of resistance under study as “disunderstand-
ing” (a portmanteau of “deliberate” and “misunderstanding”). An explainee dis-
understands when she feigns ignorance by pretending that a good explanation 
in Achinstein’s sense is a bad explanation, thereby preserving the explanatory 
demand, or by producing a novel feigned explanatory demand in relation to a 
39 Consider, though, Anderson, “Racist Humor.”
40 Bergmann, “How Many Feminists Does It Take to Make a Joke?” 74.
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troubling action or utterance. Disunderstanding demands an interrogation of 
explanations that are ethically and epistemically troubling. It urges the explainer 
to expose the dubious assumptions underwriting their explanation. The rejec-
tion can take various forms: an outright refusal to accept the revision to back-
ground assumptions (“No, I don’t get what you mean by ‘America for Ameri-
cans.’”); the conversion of the explanation into a new explanandum (“But why 
do you think that searching Muslims will make you safer?”); an articulation of 
unexpected surprise in response to an utterance or action that is normally taken 
as unsurprising (“Why did you expect your wife to adopt your surname?”); or 
an interrogation of the wrongful surprise of others (“Why would you assume I 
[a person of color] like spicy food?”).
Explanations for marginalizing actions or perspectives often rely on vague, 
euphemistic phrases (e.g., “we need to take back control”; “we’re losing our 
family values”). These phrases can act, without the need to say anything overtly 
troubling, as dog whistles that resonate strongly with those receptive to partic-
ular ideologies. Disunderstanding tries to force explainers to meet the explana-
tory demand by asking them to explicitly state what lies beneath their explana-
tion, thereby exposing those ideologies, which leaves their harmful assumptions 
vulnerable to direct critical attention.41 As Saul says in relation to challenging 
generics, we need to “press people to spell out their evidence for their generic 
claims and to reflect on what that evidence really does or doesn’t warrant.”42
Let us return to Patricia Williams’s experience of being refused entry to a 
shop on account of being Black in order to see how this might work in practice. 
Imagine I have observed this refusal and decide to challenge the shopkeeper:
Why didn’t you let her in?
We have a buzzer system so we can keep our customers safe.
What made you think she was a threat to our safety?
Well, we’ve been told to not let certain kinds of people in.
What kind of people?
People who look like they might cause trouble.
You only got a quick glance at her. What was it about her that made you 
think she would cause trouble?
41 It is similar to the strategy of “pedantry” that Elisabeth Camp recommends to disrupt trou-
bling insinuations (“Insinuation, Common Ground, and the Conversational Record”).
42 Saul, “Are Generics Especially Pernicious?” 14.
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And so the regress goes on, and the shopkeeper (assuming they are reasonably 
cooperative in this exchange and do not instead turn nasty or refuse to discuss 
the matter) is cornered toward an ever more uncomfortable position of feeling 
rumbled and forced to grapple with their own assumptions or those of their 
managers.
Disunderstanding already happens, and its results are mixed. In the ideal case, 
the explainer sees a couple of moves ahead, spots their troubling assumptions, 
and recants them, or falls silent, feeling checkmated. This is what happened in 
the Apprentice example that opened the paper. Often, people become defensive 
and withdraw from any meaningful discussion, or they become aggressive, as 
is so often the case in online discussions. Even then, an important intervention 
has often been made from which onlookers may benefit, and the troll may be de-
terred in the future. Some people do not spot the trap or their moral failings and 
are happy to follow their troubling assumptions all the way down. In those cases, 
one can only hope for a more astute witness to benefit from the intervention, but 
there can still be value in informing the explainer of their shortcomings.
One might wonder whether it is more effective to simply say “that is racist/
sexist” rather than opting for this playful strategy. There are certainly situations 
in which that would be more appropriate. If a student were to make a blunt, run-
of-the-mill racist comment, or use an obviously racist phrase, it would be more 
apt to cut them down with a comment like “that is racist and we do not tolerate 
racism in this classroom” (with the offer to talk them through this in private after 
class) rather than to painstakingly tease out their assumptions while other stu-
dents are potentially harmed by the ambiguity in the instructor’s position and 
strategy. Disunderstanding should be reserved for cases in which the process of 
realization will be valuable to the explainer and any onlookers, and where tak-
ing that route is likely to result in a more robust and self-directed reevaluation 
of their position. If a student makes a more complex or obscure racist or sexist 
statement or insinuation, as is more commonly the case, it would be more edu-
cational to use disunderstanding to show them and their peers where they have 
gone wrong, rather than to merely tell them. If they spot their error before the 
instructor names it, they are less likely to feel humiliated or become defensive.
The same holds for cases outside the classroom: disunderstanding is gener-
ally the wrong tool to deal with direct, violent, intentionally hateful acts and the 
people who commit them, but it is a powerful way of helping people to spot 
a moral shortcoming (or cornering them into seeing one as such) and allow-
ing them to follow the reasoning that will help them to call out the wrong in 
others. Ironically, disunderstanding, as opposed to merely condemning, might 
help people to understand their wrongdoing, which is a more robust way of en-
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couraging change. Further, if the wrongful explanation proceeds via a generic, 
say, “women care about how they look,” it might seem opaque or irrelevant to 
counter it with “that is sexist” and it would appear more false to say “no, they do 
not,” because in many cases, they clearly do. In this sense, disunderstanding can 
function as a dialogic form of metalinguistic negation, in which the explainee’s 
prerogative to determine whether an explanation answers the why-question (as 
Van Fraassen demands) or is good (in Achinstein’s sense) can be put to use in 
subverting the dynamic and explaining to the explainer. The explainee could dis-
understand by responding with “Sure, but why do women care so much about 
how they look?” which puts the conversation on course to reveal a more overtly 
sexist belief that may be apt for straightforward negation, or to arrive at the so-
cial origins of women’s anxieties.
Disunderstanding need not be verbal. It may consist of behaviors that enact a 
refusal to follow rules that are supported by a widely accepted explanation. Con-
sider Claudette Colvin’s and Rosa Parks’s deliberate refusals to understand the 
rules concerning segregated seating on buses, forcing the racist policy into overt 
discussion. Lawmakers were forced either to attempt to explain their reasoning 
more forcefully or to change the law. Queering one’s performance of gender is 
also in some cases a deliberate refusal to understand gender essentialism or the 
sex-gender binary.
It is important to note that the method of resistance I am recommending 
could be, in a different social context, a harmful practice. Kristie Dotson de-
scribes the way in which marginalized speakers discussing their marginalization 
are often silenced by audiences precisely because successful communication re-
quires “an audience willing and capable of hearing [them].”43 If an audience re-
fuses uptake to a speaker because of ignorance (intentional or otherwise) or be-
cause the credibility of the speaker has been deflated (i.e., testimonial injustice), 
an explanation will be blocked in ways that are epistemically and ethically trou-
bling. It is therefore important to specify the scope of disunderstanding, which 
is intended as a purposeful tool for resisting marginalization, rather than as a way 
of reinscribing power. It is doubtful that disunderstanding could be successfully 
misused in this way, since oppressive utterances and actions have a habit of rest-
ing on various unstated, harmful assumptions in ways that anti-oppressive expla-
43 Dotson, “Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing,” 238. Similarly, Cull 
describes “dismissive incomprehension,” whereby a listener feigns incomprehension of an-
other person’s speech in order to discredit them in the eyes of others. Gaslighting is an 
extreme form of dismissive incomprehension in which the speaker is made to doubt her 
own credibility (“Dismissive Incomprehension”). See also Kukla’s “discursive injustice” 
(“Performative Force, Convention, and Discursive Injustice”) and Langton’s “illocutionary 
silencing” and “perlocutionary silencing” (“Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts”).
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nations do not, but the analysis in this paper may shed light on the ways in which 
something akin to disunderstanding is attempted by those who intend harm.
Of course, a person’s ability to resist an explanation, like her ability to resist 
simpliciter, is critically dependent on her positionality. Those who are most likely 
to identify the need to resist are also those for whom resistance might turn out to 
be costliest or most dangerous. Further, due to widespread epistemic prejudices, 
they are also most likely to be deemed to genuinely misunderstand and require 
additional instruction from a person who deems himself to have greater exper-
tise.44 There is an irony here: disunderstanding often requires that a person who 
is seen as less knowledgeable perform ignorance in order to force the person who 
is seen as more knowledgeable to face up to their actual ignorance. These points 
emphasize the importance of allyship: those who are relatively privileged are 
best placed to practice disunderstanding in order to erode harmful assumptions 
and reduce the likelihood that those who are directly affected will encounter 
them. This requires those with greater comparative privilege (particularly in an 
epistemic sense) to be continually attentive to the teachings of oppressed people, 
so that when the moment arises, they will be equipped to sense the underlying 
assumptions and be prepared to excavate them.
Accepting an explanation that is marginalizing requires that a person revise 
(or appear to revise) their background assumptions to accommodate content 
that produces, entrenches, or ignores injustices. Conversely, if a person out-
wardly refuses to understand, the speech act is thwarted, and the explanatory 
demand persists, forcing the explainer to more carefully scrutinize their own 
assumptions in the course of attempting to generate an alternative explanation. 
Disunderstanding blocks wrongful requests for understanding and can there-
fore contribute to destabilizing explanatory injustice.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, I have built on the work of Pohlhaus to show that understanding, 
which is conferred as a result of successful explanations, is not always ethically 
and epistemically virtuous. I have formalized a way of refusing to understand by 
disrupting the successful operation of an oppressive explanation. A successful 
explanation requires that the explainee’s why-question be answered by the per-
locutionary act of revision to her background assumptions and that she commu-
nicate that success. Importantly, this means that explanations are collaborative, 
and the explainee plays a critical role in the process of explaining; an explanation 
is not successful unless an explainee deems it to be so. By feigning misunder-
44 Consider mansplaining. See note 28.
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standing in specific ways, explainees can therefore disrupt oppressive explana-
tions that rely on problematic assumptions and generalizations with false impli-
catures. As such, there is epistemic and ethical merit in the explainee subverting 
her expected role as the cooperative recipient of an explanation, in strategically 
disunderstanding in order to force the conspicuousness and interrogation of mar-
ginalizing epistemologies.45
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